


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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-271
29 August 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, NFIB
FROM : 
 Chairman
SUBJECT : Monthly Report - August 1977

This memorandum forwards the monthly activities report
for August 1977 for the DCI Security Committee.



Attachment:
as stated

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SUBJECT; Monthly Report - August 1977

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DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE
MONTHLY REPORT

August 1977

I. Highlights:

25X1 a. [] Committee action and ICS coordination was completed on an update and revision of DCID 1/16 on computer security. The DCI approved the circulation of this proposed DCID to NFIB members, and it will be placed on a future NFIB agenda if required. The Committee has two other proposed DCID's awaiting NFIB action. These pertain to compartmentation and duty and travel restrictions.

25X1 b. [] A Security Committee Staff member has continued to assist in drafting the new Executive Order on security classification requested by the President in PRM-29. He is now also assisting in the drafting of the implementing directive for the new Order. Copies of the draft Order have been circulated within the IC Staff for information and comments.

25X1 c. [] Special Coordination Committee agreement during PRM-29 deliberations that paragraph classification marking should be mandatory permitted the Security Committee to resume drafting a DCI policy directive which would implement that for the Intelligence Community and apply the same principle to require paragraph marking of security controls unique to the Community.

II. Work in Progress:

25X1 a. [] A review of DCID 1/14 has been underway as directed by the DCI in his review of security policy associated with sensitive compartmented information. Although all agencies have still not been heard from, the prevailing view to date is that the investigative standards are deemed to be adequate and should not be changed. While most agencies do conform to the five-year reinvestigation cycle, there is some slippage of this due to inadequate investigative resources. One agency reported that their employee personnel having access to SCI are reinvestigated on an approximate 11-year cycle.

25X1 b. [] The first phase of the study to determine the scope and timeframe of a security investigation for TOP SECRET access has been completed and a report of these findings was sent to the Security Committee members. This report will be discussed at our 7 September meeting. At that time we hope that members will agree to adopt the techniques of this pilot study on a more permanent basis in their agencies in order to increase our data base and verify the reliability of these findings. Eventually we will be considering the adjudication process and even realistic alternatives to investigative techniques or standards, particularly those involving high costs.

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c. ☐ In updating our study on a Community-wide Computer-assisted Compartmentation Control System (4C's), we have met with Office of Data Processing personnel at CIA. We are not only focusing in on a 4C's update, but are also addressing the current ☐ system. With their assistance, we hope to produce a cost estimate comparison and a comparison of capabilities and shortcomings of each system. With this information, recommendations will then be made to the A/D/DCI/IC and the DCI.

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d. ☐ At our 7 September meeting, we will consider a problem surfaced by Air Force concerning the release of information to contractors. They are experiencing difficulty in obtaining timely originator release or denial of NSA, CIA, and DIA products needed by Air Force contractors. They reported the accumulation of a backlog of several hundred requests, some of which were submitted eight months ago.

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e. ☐ A Security Committee Staff member is continuing to provide inputs to the PRM-23 Space Policy Review with regard to the issue of security policy for overhead reconnaissance.

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